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Comment Nouriel Roubini
This paper presents an empirical study of the causes of the Korean crisis
of 1997–98. The authors analyze whether the crisis was due to domestic
fundamentals or external interdependence (or contagion). They present a
variety of evidence, both econometric and more qualitative.
There has been a broad debate on whether the Korean crisis was due to
fundamentals or rather was caused by a liquidity run (with foreign banks
suddenly withdrawing interbank lines) exacerbated by international conta-
gion. In a sense, these alternative explanations are not contradictory but
rather complementary. Seriously weak fundamentals may have initially
triggered the crisis, but international contagion from East Asia to Korea
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(and vice versa) and a self-fulﬁlling bank-run psychology and panic may
have exacerbated it. So, the issue is more one of the relative weight of al-
ternative explanations. My reading of this paper and of the overall evi-
dence for Korea is that fundamentals certainly played an important role.
Although traditional fundamentals were not important in Korea (as public
deﬁcits and debt were low; inﬂation low; and savings and investment rates
high), other structural weaknesses related to the ﬁnancial system and dis-
torted investment and borrowing incentives were very important. To sum-
marize, the fundamental weaknesses of Korea, even before the onset of
the currency crisis at the end of 1997, were as follows:
1. A severe recession in early 1997, well before the currency crisis.
2. Severe corporate distress (with seven out of the top thirty chaebols
being eﬀectively bankrupt by the middle of 1997). The distress of the cor-
porations led to signiﬁcant distress for a wide range of ﬁnancial institu-
tions (merchant and commercial banks).
3. Large current account deﬁcits in 1996 driven by excessive investment
and severe terms of trade shock (the fall in semiconductor prices) and a
moderate amount of real appreciation of the currency.
4. Current account deﬁcits mostly ﬁnanced by short-term unhedged
foreign currency loans (mostly cross-border interbank loans).
5. Short-term debt to foreign reserves (an important early warning sig-
nal) was high at the onset of the crisis and inward FDI very low given
restrictions and regulations to FDI.
6. Dominance of the economy by “empire maximizing” chaebols that
were overinvesting and ineﬃcient.
7. Excessive investment was partly driven by “connected lending” and
“directed lending” policies. Moral hazard-inducing implicit and explicit
guarantees also distorted investment and borrowing and lending decisions
of chaebols and ﬁnancial institutions. Poor supervision and regulation of
the ﬁnancial system worsened such distortions.
8. High leverage of the chaebols with debt-to-equity ratios being on av-
erage over 300 percent even before the crisis, and devaluation further in-
creased the burden of foreign currency debt.
9. Low proﬁtability of investment with two-thirds of chaebols having
losses in 1996 and the return on capital being low in the 1990s.
The qualitative and quantitative evidence presented in the paper is con-
sistent with this assessment, suggesting an important role for fundamentals
in triggering the crisis. The authors ﬁnd some role for both contagion and
domestic fundamentals.
The econometric analysis of the role of fundamentals and contagion is
performed in sections 10.2 and 10.3. In section 10.2, using a standard
probit model with data from about 100 countries, the authors ﬁnd that
fundamental weaknesses played a role, although contagion channels were
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also important (more geographic proximity than trade). A few comments
on these results: First, traditional probit models are unable to capture non-
traditional fundamentals because data on variables other than standard
macro ones are not easily available. As the previous discussion suggests,
the weaknesses of Korea were in its ﬁnancial system and corporate struc-
ture rather than just traditional macro weaknesses. However, such struc-
tural variables are hard to measure and are not usually included in empiri-
cal models of the likelihood of a currency crisis. This may explain why the
predictive power of the model is good but statistically not very large. Sec-
ond, because proxies for geographic proximity and trade are highly corre-
lated, it is not clear whether the stronger statistical signiﬁcance of “prox-
imity” relative to trade links is driven by such trade links. Third, it would
have been useful to derive some direct proxies of ﬁnancial contagion (such
as common creditor links) rather than rely on proximity as a proxy for
such contagion links. Fourth, the decomposition in table 10.3 of the contri-
bution of various variables to the crisis probability is qualitatively interest-
ing and sensible, but the quantitative contribution of signiﬁcant factors
(e.g., FDI, high debt to reserves, and terms of trade shocks) is modest.
Given the signiﬁcant contribution of the contagion variable, more could
be done to ﬁgure out what this variable really proxies for: Is it “rational”
contagion or “irrational” contagion?
Section 10.3 considers in more detail the contagion question by studying
daily data on exchange rates and sovereign spreads for a set of emerging
market economies. Interestingly, the authors relate these asset prices to
news on Korea’s economy and ﬁnancial markets. They ﬁnd that negative
news about ﬁnancial distress of chaebols and ﬁnancial institutions drives
such asset prices. The analysis is interesting and the results sensible. There
are a number of general limitations to this approach: The country sample
is small; there are missing macro variables in the regressions, given the use
of daily data; and other asset prices such as stock prices and domestic
interest rates could also have been analyzed.
Some remarks on the exchange rate results: First, the correlation be-
tween the value of the won and the yen may be spurious and driven by
movement of the U.S. dollar; i.e., statistical correlation may occur even
if the two exchange rates are statistically independent. One could use a
numeraire to deal with this issue. Second, high correlation may be due to
heteroscedasticity (high variance in turbulent times). Third, some correla-
tions are low (as for the Japan correlations), but splitting the sample into
subperiods (such as those in 1998 when the yen was weak and falling) may
provide better results. Fourth, the VAR results on the contagion from East
Asia to the Korean currency are interesting; conversely, one may argue
that the free fall of the won in the fall of 1997 led to another round of
contagious eﬀects from Korea to the rest of the region.
The results on sovereign spreads are somewhat surprising: Korea’s
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spreads seem to be more correlated with those of Latin America than
those of Asia. This may be due to some “cross-hedging” across markets.
Also, the robustness of this result in subsamples of turbulent periods may
have to be tested. Also, the results of the Granger causality tests showing
causality going from Korea to East Asia but not vice versa are a bit at
odds with the exchange rate results suggesting contagion from East Asia
to Korea.
The results on the eﬀects of news on asset prices are novel and interest-
ing; they conﬁrm the view that negative domestic news about chaebols and
ﬁnancial distress of commercial and merchant banks as well as govern-
ment bailout policies negatively aﬀected asset markets. Two issues here:
Although bailout news signals that there are serious distress problems,
they should reduce panic and runs as long as the bailout commitment is
credible. The results instead seem to suggest that bailout news is perceived
as negative by investors. Second, ﬁnding a signiﬁcant eﬀect of bad news on
asset prices does not rule out the possibility that such prices overreacted to
the news; it is one thing to ﬁnd that news matters, and another to infer
that such signiﬁcant relations between news and prices imply no over-
shooting of such prices to the news. In the absence of a fundamental model
of the quantitative eﬀect of such news, it is again hard to assess whether
Korean ﬁnancial markets and foreign investors overreacted to the negative
news that came out of the Korean economy at the end of 1997. Although
fundamentals played a strong role, as the paper convincingly argues, at the
end of 1997 some run psychology and panic may have been triggered by
such negative developments and may have led Korea to the brink of de-
fault. Only the negotiated agreement at the end of 1997 between Korea
and its international creditor banks to roll over short term cross-border
lines avoided this potentially disastrous outcome.
In conclusion, this is an interesting empirical study of the causes of the
Korean crisis; it conﬁrms the view that fundamentals mattered in trig-
gering the crisis but that external interdependence (contagion) also mat-
tered. The results appear to be convincing. Perhaps the authors could have
tried to probe a little more the alternative view that Korea’s crisis was
caused by a self-fulﬁlling bank run and panic.
Comment Ponciano S. Intal, Jr.
I would like to congratulate Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hong for their
admirable eﬀort in analyzing the causes of the recent currency crisis in
Korea. I start my comments on a few technical points. Afterwards, I will
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